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ARTICLES 
 
SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST 
THROUGH LEGISLATIVE PRESSURE: A 
CASE STUDY OF THE COASE THEOREM AS 
APPLIED TO THE COLLEGE BASKETBALL 
SHOE SCANDAL 
 
STEPHEN F. ROSS & MILES J. GUENO* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent federal prosecutions reveal widespread corruption in youth 
basketball.1  Illegal fraud conspiracies are driven by major shoe companies, who 
seek an unfair advantage years later in signing National Basketball Association 
(NBA) stars to lucrative endorsement deals.  The result victimizes many players, 
and it distorts how teenagers train and develop.  Youth basketball could be 
reformed by direct government regulation.  Most corruption could also be 
eliminated by an agreement between the NBA and its players association, the 
National Basketball Players Association (NBPA), to reshape how endorsement 
deals are made.  Such an agreement would likely be efficient and beneficial to 
clubs, NBA players, and most youth basketball stakeholders serving legitimate 
interests.  However, it is virtually certain that—absent outside help—the parties 
would never agree.  This Article applies the principles of the original Coase 
 
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for the Study of Sports in Society, The Pennsylvania State 
University, and J.D. candidate, 2020, Penn State Law.  We thank participants in a faculty seminar at Penn 
State, a workshop for Justice Ginsburg’s former clerks, and a session of the Western Economics Association 
International for their feedback, and Joel Litvin and Mark Storslee for detailed comments on earlier drafts. 
1.  Will Hobson & Kevin Armstrong, All Three Defendants Found Guilty of Wire Fraud in College 
Basketball Corruption Trial, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/ 
all-three-defendants-found-guilty-of-wire-fraud-in-college-basketball-corruption-trial/2018/10/24/fba5b866-
d7be-11e8-a10f-b51546b10756_story.html?utm_term=.77533a1cf292.  
ROSS – ARTICLE 30.1 1/10/2020  12:07 PM 
10 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 30:1 
  
Theorem2 to explain why.  It then builds upon Coase’s insights to suggest that, 
in a context of imperfect but attainable information, and significant-but-not-
insurmountable bargaining costs, legislative pressure is an effective public 
policy strategy to facilitate a private agreement that is efficient and socially 
beneficial. 
Recently, shoe company executives and college basketball coaches were 
convicted of conspiracy to violate federal anti-fraud statutes by funneling 
money to star high school players’ families and advisors.  The conspiracy was 
designed to induce players to attend specific universities with an endorsement 
relationship with the shoe company, and to steer these players toward selecting 
agents or financial managers likely to induce their future clients to sign 
endorsement contracts with the shoe companies.3  The first trial in fall 2018 
resulted in convictions of two Adidas executives and an agent for fraud relating 
to under-the-table payments to families of star recruits to affirm their 
commitment to the Adidas-affiliated University of Louisville.4  The trial 
evidence showed that the defendants paid families of five recruits amounts 
ranging from $2,500 to $100,000.5 
Brian Bowen, Jr., an elite high school basketball player whose parents 
accepted a $100,000 payment by Adidas officials to commit to the University 
of Louisville, alleges that Adidas officials, Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) 
coaches, financial advisers, and college coaches conspired to commit bribery 
 
2.  See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter 
Coase]. 
3.  United States v. Gatto, 295 F. Supp. 3d 336, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (explaining the alleged scheme as: 
“defendants and their co-conspirators [paying] bribes to certain high school basketball players bound for 
NCAA Division I universities and/or their families in exchange for commitments by the students to 
matriculate at specific universities and then retain Dawkins' services and sign with Company–1 [Adidas] once 
they turned professional”).  By infringing NCAA rules, the conspirators defrauded Louisville and the 
University of Miami, who would not have awarded scholarships to those recruits if they had known about the 
illicit payments.  Id.  The theory that the universities—whose coaches were active participants in the 
conspiracy and who profited by recruiting these star athletes—were the victims of fraud is controversial and 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  For reasons the government’s attorneys did not articulate, the claim that 
the victims were universities seeking to recruit the athletes in a non-corrupt manner was not raised.  Nor did 
the prosecution pursue the argument that the athletes themselves were victims as the motivation to steer them 
to business managers and agents who would lead them to sign contracts with a particular shoe company was 
not fully disclosed.  See, e.g., Gentry Estes, College Basketball’s Trap: How Agents and Shoe Companies 
Team Up to Exploit Athletes, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.ksdk.com/article/sports/ 
ncaab/college-basketballs-trap-how-agents-and-shoe-companies-team-up-to-exploit-athletes/63-523407036 
(explaining players often do not realize they are “being played” by shoe company representatives and coaches 
or family members). 
4.  Hobson & Armstrong, supra note 1. 
5.  Id. 
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and fraud.6  The scheme’s purpose was to induce elite high school basketball 
players to play at certain universities for their own profit.7  Further, the 
complaint alleges that the concerted scheme caused disadvantaged high school 
athletes, like Bowen, to lose (a) their eligibility, (b) the funds necessary to 
further their education and (c) the opportunity to develop their basketball talents 
at the collegiate level.8   
These payments arise in the context of the global industry of athletic shoe 
marketing.  A cornerstone of the marketing strategy for major athletic shoe and 
apparel companies, such as Nike, Adidas, and Under Armour (hereafter referred 
collectively as “shoe companies”), is to obtain endorsements from star 
basketball players.  Competition for star basketball players commences at the 
high school level.9  This is because an astounding number of players who choose 
to participate with youth clubs sponsored by a particular shoe company choose 
to attend universities who are officially sponsored by the same company, and an 
astounding number of NBA players choose to endorse the shoe company 
sponsoring their college team.10  Rivalry among the shoe companies is fierce, 
and exists in the context of regulations adopted by the member schools of the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) that prohibit players from 
signing endorsement contracts if they wish to play college basketball within the 
NCAA.11  Because NCAA rules preclude an immediate commercial relationship 
between shoe companies and collegiate athletes, shoe companies see an 
enormous advantage if they can influence players in high school to attend 
universities with whom they have sponsorship relationships.12 The advantages 
shoe companies gain from this tactic include: (a) profits from the success of 
sponsored college teams,13 (b) increased profits from promoting top high school 
 
6.  Complaint (Jury Trial Demanded) at 1-5, 147, Bowen v. Adidas America, Inc., No. 3:18-3118-JFA, 
2018 WL 6061800 (D. S.C. Nov. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Bowen Complaint]. 
7.  Id. at 118–22. 
8.  Id. at 124. 
9.  Estes, supra note 3.  
10.  Id. (“Nike colleges landed more than 85 percent of the five-star prospects who have signed with a 
school since 2003, and roughly 75 percent of all of those five-star players who reached the NBA wear or have 
worn Nike”).  
11.   NCAA, 2017-18 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 12.1.2.4.11, at 67 (Aug. 1, 2017) (stating a 
prospective student-athlete may not “enter into an arrangement . . . with an apparel or equipment manufacturer 
or distributor that permits the prospective student-athlete to select apparel and equipment items from a 
commercial establishment of the manufacturer or distributor[.]”). 
12.  Bowen Complaint, supra note 6, at 57. 
13.  Will Hobson, Inside the Basketball Black Market That Put Adidas in the FBI’s Crosshairs, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 1, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/all-three-defendants-found-guilty-of-
wire-fraud-in-college-basketball-corruption-trial/2018/10/24/fba5b866-d7be-11e8-a10f 
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recruits wearing their brand,14 and (c) an advantage over rivals in signing future 
NBA stars to endorsement contracts upon turning professional.15  
Under-the-table payments are problematic for many reasons, even for those 
who do not subscribe to the NCAA’s view that college athletes should not be 
paid.  The business model supporting these payments distorts the process by 
which elite teenagers select colleges, and creates strong incentives for coaches, 
families, and advisors to steer newly-professional players to sign endorsement 
contracts with the favored company, even if not in the athlete’s best interest.  It 
also creates a structure where many elite players are trained and developed by 
those primarily interested in gaining a competitive advantage in signing NBA 
stars to endorsement deals, rather than the interests of the players.  Finally, the 
business model also results in less endorsement money for established NBA 
players, whose endorsements actually drive shoe sales.16 
Solutions to this problem include everything from eradicating poverty, 
abolishing the NCAA, publicly funding youth basketball as a well-regulated 
competition under the aegis of USA Basketball, or direct federal regulation of 
youth coaches, agents and managers, and shoe company contracts.  However, a 
less radical intervention may be required.   
Most of this corruption could be eliminated if NBA players were 
compensated for endorsements under a scheme where they collectively agreed 
not to endorse shoe companies unless they were the official sponsor of the club 
for which they play.  Under this scheme, a significant portion of the money now 
used to lure youth to sign with designated colleges would go directly to NBA 
clubs in the form of official sponsorships that would skyrocket in value; most 
of these funds would then be redistributed pursuant to a collective bargaining 
agreement to the NBPA and then redistributed by them back to the players.  As 
 
b51546b10756_story.html?utm_term=.77533a1cf292. “For Nike, Adidas and Under Armour, grass-roots 
basketball is an educated gamble—money spent in the hope that, among thousands of teenagers playing in 
their leagues, a few will become recognizable stars for their sponsored college teams and develop into NBA 
players worthy of endorsement deals. The overarching strategy is to cast a wide net and hopefully attract the 
next generational talent who will develop a lifelong affinity for the brand—and sell truckloads of shoes.” Id.  
14.  Matthew Kish, Exclusive: Adidas Drops Bid to Extend NBA Deal, Redraws Basketball Strategy, 
PORTLAND BUS. J. (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.bizjournals.com/portland/blog/threads_and_laces/2015/03/ 
exclusive-adidas-drops-nba-bid-redraws-basketball.html (explaining that Adidas is implementing a new 
strategy by targeting their marketing efforts on promoting Adidas through high school kids. Chris Grancio, 
Adidas's global basketball general manager, explains, “[w]e haven't been able to elevate our brand for the 
basketball consumer that we're targeting. We ultimately decided that we would change our investment strategy 
and invest more players on the court.”). 
15.  Hobson, supra note 13. 
16.  Cameron Chung, Top 4 Sports Agent Scandals, SPORTS AGENT BLOG (Aug. 18, 2017), 
http://sportsagentblog.com/2017/08/18/top-5-sports-agent-scandals/ (illustrating how “UCLA basketball star 
Tyler Honeycutt, [] accepted over $55,000 from agent Noah Lookofsky during his two years in LA and even 
while still in high school[,]” then decided to employ another agent upon reaching the NBA.) 
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a result, young players would make less-distorted decisions about colleges, and 
new professionals would select agents and managers acting solely in their own 
interest.  Elite teenagers may see fewer opportunities for free travel and apparel, 
and some families will see less money in under-the-table payments, but players 
would continue to participate in less-corrupt youth competitions and would 
henceforth receive training designed to maximize their own development rather 
than their club’s brand.   
The insights of Ronald Coase, the Nobel-prize winning pioneer in the field 
of law and economics, explain why the parties will never agree voluntarily to 
the proposed scheme, even though NBA players and clubs would arguably be 
better off.  Coase is famous for his theorem that an efficient result will be 
obtained regardless of the legal assignments of rights and duties, if the relevant 
parties have perfect information and there are no transactional or bargaining 
costs.17  Less attention is given to the clear corollary to this theorem, which 
Coase also articulated: where the parties lack information, or where substantial 
bargaining costs exist, the parties cannot be expected to reach the optimal result, 
and so the law will affect the parties behavior and should be tailored to reach an 
efficient result.18  Even less attention is given to the intermediate case, where 
information asymmetries and bargaining costs inhibit an efficient agreement; 
the parties in this case may be induced by external pressure to overcome these 
challenges and reach an efficient solution. 
Coase posited two cases to illustrate his theorem. In one, a farmer’s corn is 
destroyed by an adjoining rancher’s cows wandering through her crops.  If the 
efficient solution is to build a fence, and the efficient fence-builder is the farmer, 
the farmer will build the fence regardless of liability. If the law imposes no 
liability, the farmer will build the fence as a cheaper alternative than crop 
destruction.  If the law makes the rancher liable, she will pay the farmer to build 
the fence (which is cheaper either than paying for crop damage or building the 
fence herself).19   In the second case, a railroad traveling through farmland 
releases sparks creating fires that damage crops of hundreds of farmers within 
vicinity of the train’s path.  Although the efficient solution may be for the 
railroad to install equipment to prevent the engine from dispensing sparks, 
whether this occurs depends on liability.20  If the railroad is not liable, it would 
be insurmountable to organize the mass of farmers along the railroad’s route to 
 
17.  See generally Coase, supra note 2.  
18.  Id. at 15–16. 
19.  Id. at 2–6. 
20.  Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 IOWA L. REV. 577, 588 
(1987), citing Coase, supra note 2, at 33. 
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pay a proportionate share of the cost to the railroad for equipment installation. 
In the latter case, the law needs to intervene.   
There is a third case however, where the information is not perfect and 
bargaining is not costless, but with sufficient incentives the parties can reach an 
efficient agreement.  In such case, this Article analyzes how legislative pressure 
may persuade parties to overcome costs and reach the desired result.  To 
illustrate, the Article discusses the current controversy of under-the-table 
payments by shoe companies to elite young basketball players and their families 
to illustrate the Coase Theorem, and offers a more modest solution than 
government intervention: legislative pressure to induce the parties to overcome 
bargaining and information problems to reach an efficient and socially-
beneficial solution.   
In Part II, the Article details how shoe companies compete to obtain 
endorsements from star athletes by massive subsidies to youth basketball teams, 
and by influencing high school athletes toward specific college basketball 
programs.  It discusses the costs of this approach, both to the shoe companies 
and to the athletes’ potentially inefficient selection of college programs and 
agents, as well as the side benefit of promoting access to elite competitions by 
economically disadvantaged teenagers.  Part III proposes a more efficient way 
to market shoes through celebrity endorsement: including in the collective 
bargaining agreement between the NBA and the NBPA a provision that NBA 
players may not endorse shoe or apparel products except for the company that 
officially sponsors the club for which they are employed.  This Article asserts 
that most of the money shoe companies would save from its massive indirect 
effort to influence teenagers would instead go into substantially increased 
payments to NBA clubs for official sponsorships; an efficient agreement would 
allow NBA clubs to retain a modest increase in their current income but would 
give an overwhelming percentage of the sponsorship money to the NBPA for 
redistribution to its players. Further, there would likely be sufficient funds 
leftover to provide organized support by the NBA and its players, perhaps under 
the aegis of USA Basketball, for targeted funding to promote equal economic 
access to youth sports.  Under the proposed scheme, this Article argues that shoe 
companies, the NBA, and its players (collectively) would all be better off, and 
individual star players would be unharmed based on the redistribution formula 
adopted by the NBPA. 
Part IV describes why this is unlikely to happen, based on a narrative 
understood by anyone with passing familiarity with the Coase Theorem.  The 
precise amount of shoe company savings, and likely investment in official NBA 
club sponsorship, is unknown.  At the outset of bargaining, NBA owners would 
be unlikely to agree to give ninety percent of the marginal funds to the players.  
Star players would be very reluctant to support a scheme that would endanger 
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their lucrative contracts without knowing the precise formula the union would 
adopt to redistribute funds.  The NBPA would face pressure from stakeholders 
who would lose out from a more efficient scheme, including corrupt middlemen 
and legitimate agents who earn fees from player endorsements but not from 
income redistributed by the union. 
Part V suggests a less interventionist alternative than regulation: legislative 
pressure.  The facts and bargaining problems faced in securing a complex, multi-
party understanding between shoe companies, the NBA, and its players are 
significant, but not insuperable.  This part suggests an illustrative model: Major 
League Baseball’s (MLB) ability to overcome similar obstacles to secure an 
agreement with its players union on drug testing for performance enhancing 
drugs (PEDs).  Bargaining problems kept the parties apart until Senator John 
McCain, the chair of the Senate Committee on Commerce, credibly threatened 
federal legislation to regulate this issue.  Faced with the prospect that a 
resolution to this complex issue might be subject to the political process, and 
that inevitable modifications because of the dynamic nature of drug testing 
would require returning to Congress, Commissioner Bud Selig and Major 
League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) Director Donald Fehr overcame 
bargaining costs to reach a solution.21 This Article suggests a similar result here: 
a credible threat of federal legislation to regulate shoe endorsements would lead 
to a market-based result reflection from the negotiation of the parties. 
II. THE CURRENT MARKET FOR SHOE COMPANY ENDORSEMENTS 
The shoe companies’ current scheme to target grassroots basketball is 
designed to lure young basketball players into their brand for future 
endorsement, if and when they become professional athletes.  This Part 
discusses the profitability of this scheme, how the shoe companies’ marketing 
strategy distorts high school players’ selection of colleges, agents and managers, 
and identifies inefficiencies in the current scheme. Finally, it analyzes the 
benefits and downfalls of this strategy for youth basketball. 
A. Overview of the current business model 
Although only relatively few elite NBA stars have the fame to influence 
significant purchases of shoes and other sports apparel, shoe companies have 
recognized that waiting until a player establishes himself as a star is far too late 
 
21.  Larry Brown, Exploring John McCain’s Profound Impact on the Sports World, LARRY BROWN 
SPORTS (Aug. 25, 2018), http://larrybrownsports.com/baseball/john-mccain-profound-impact-sports-
world/461521; Dana Milbank & Thomas Heath, McCain Threatens Baseball Over Drugs, WASH. POST, Dec. 
4, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33702-2004Dec3.html. 
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to commence competitive bidding for his endorsement.22  Shoe companies now 
focus on a wide array of efforts to influence the player’s decision much earlier 
in their life and career.  Aside from the actual compensation of an NBA player, 
most of the companies’ investments fall into three major categories: (1) official 
sponsorship of major college basketball programs; (2) funding national 
tournaments under the auspices of the AAU; and (3) funding and sponsoring of 
individual teams participating in AAU competition. 
The official sponsorship approach can be illustrated by UCLA’s fifteen-
year, $280 million deal with Under Armour.23 The deal states that “Under 
Armour [will commit] to supplying an average of $7.4 million in clothing, shoes 
and equipment each school year and contribute an additional $2 million over the 
next eight years for upgrades at [UCLA athletic] facilities.”24 
The recruiting process begins by sponsorship of tournaments and teams in 
AAU competitions.  The AAU summer leagues (hereinafter referred to as 
“circuits”) provide a forum for AAU coaches, brand representatives and college 
coaches to influence the prospect and his family to remain loyal to the shoe 
company brand.  Through the AAU circuits, AAU coaches and brand 
representatives, and college coaches facilitate continuous dialogue with parents 
and athletes, designed so the prospect will remain with the brand from AAU 
until the NBA.25  
At the AAU level, the shoe companies sponsor programs that 
regularly feature top prospects, who are lured to a limited 
number of teams that play in high-profile events sponsored by 
the companies.  
Shoe companies also sponsor high school and prep school 
programs, but nothing is guaranteed. As with many AAU 
teams, the loss of top talent may mean the end of shoe company 
funding.  
 
22.  Brad Schmidt & Jeff Manning, Basketball Bribes: How Adidas Bankrolled a Black Market for Top 
Teenage Talent, OREGONIAN, Feb. 4, 2019, https://www.oregonlive.com/business/2019/02/basketball-bribes-
how-adidas-bankrolled-a-black-market-for-top-teenage-talent.html (“Adidas would help coaches at Adidas-
sponsored schools identify and recruit high-school talent while having direct access to college players who 
might be stars-in-the-making.” This article eludes to the fact that the corrupt scheme shoe companies perform 
is predicated on identifying young talent in high school and monitoring these recruits progress toward stardom 
and profitability through college to the NBA.). 
23.  David Wharton, UCLA’s Under Armour Deal for $280 Million is the Biggest in NCAA History, L.A. 
TIMES, May 24, 2016, https://www.latimes.com/sports/ucla/la-sp-0525-ucla-under-armour-20160525-snap-
story.html.  
24.  Id. 
25.  Estes, supra note 3. 
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The setup creates an incentive for basketball coaches at all 
levels to remain loyal to a shoe company brand — and have 
players do the same — while also continuing to recruit fresh 
talent on behalf of the shoe company.26 
Shoe companies contract with universities to be the sole apparel provider to all 
of the university’s sports teams. These agreements provide a two-fold return on 
investment for the shoe company and the university. The shoe company benefits 
from increased profits due to the fans/alumni of the university who purchase 
their apparel. In addition, sponsorships provide shoe companies with 
irreplaceable exposure to prospective NBA stars, to facilitate their agreement to 
professional deals when the college stars make the NBA. In return, the 
universities profit from the revenue contractually designated to them and by 
having affiliation with the shoe brand.   One report details how this scheme is 
extremely successful for Nike: 
Since 2003, roughly 80 percent of five-star prospects from 
Nike-affiliated AAU or travel teams went on to play for a Nike-
sponsored college. Of all five-star players who reached the 
NBA, roughly 87 percent of those who were affiliated with 
Nike through youth teams and colleges continued to wear or 
endorse those shoes as professionals.  
Nike colleges landed more than 85 percent of the five-star 
prospects who have signed with a school since 2003, and 
roughly 75 percent of all of those five-star players who reached 
the NBA wear or have worn Nike, compared to 18 percent for 
Adidas and 3 percent for Under Armour.27 
The shoe companies’ third major marketing expense is the cost of hosting 
national tournaments in concert with AAU.  Nike, Adidas and Under Armour 
all sponsor circuits in which prospective players try out for a specific team.28  
For example, Team Whynot, a Los Angeles based team, will hold tryouts at a 
local high school or gymnasium.29 If selected by Team Whynot, the athlete 
would become part of the EYBL circuit (Elite Youth Basketball League), owned 
and funded by Nike.  Nike will then supply the teen with apparel and shoes, 
 
26.  Id.  
27.  Id. 
28.  Mike Enright, How Much Does EYBL Cost, RECRUIT LOOK (2015), https://recruitlook.com/dwqa-
answer/answer-for-how-much-does-eybl-cost/ (explaining that most AAU teams charge a tryout fee between 
$10 and $30, and a membership fee of $500 to fund facilities to practice and train, and to cover costs for 
summer travel and tournaments, staff, and facility fees).  
29. Team Whynot (CA), D1 CIRCUIT, https://www.d1circuit.com/page/show/4918376?subseason= 
599727&tab=content (last visited Dec. 6, 2019). 
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worth hundreds of dollars, and exposure to scouts and coaches from top Nike-
sponsored colleges, such as Kentucky, North Carolina, and Duke.30 Given that 
AAU teams are non-profit organizations, they can hold fundraisers, seek 
sponsors, and receive donations.31 These other sources of income are usually 
designated for operating the team and helping economically challenged families 
who struggle to afford the costs to participate with the team.32 
Shoe companies spend significant capital operating their respective AAU 
circuits. Each is comprised of numerous tournaments and teams. To illustrate, 
the Nike Peach Jam is an end of the year tournament for Nike EYBL teams.33  
The teams in Nike’s EYBL circuit who have the most success competing in 
EYBL tournaments throughout the summer will qualify for the Peach Jam 
invitational.34  The Nike Peach Jam exhibits games from 9:00 A.M. to 9:00 P.M. 
for four days.35  Nike’s sponsorship deals with EYBL teams cover the costs of 
travel concerning trips to tournaments around the country.36   In addition to 
receiving apparel throughout the year, Nike provides EYBL players whose 
teams qualify for the Peach Jam with exclusive shoes and apparel bearing the 
Peach Jam logo (this year’s signature shoe will be the new Nike KD 11).37   
 
30.  See Nike EYBL the Inside Scoop, HOOP DREAMS MAG. (May 23, 2013), 
http://hoopdreamsmag.com/?p=6985 (discussing how EYBL players receive special edition shoes for 
qualifying for the Nike Peach Jam tournament: “all players receive a custom pair of Nike EYBL sneakers 
along with EYBL uniforms and an assortment of other gear”). See also SI Wire, How Adidas, Nike and Under 
Armour Have Divvied Up Major College Basketball, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://www.si.com/college/2017/10/02/adidas-nike-under-armour-contracts-schools-conferences 
(identifying schools signing with each shoe company). 
31.  Doug Green, Bottom Line: AAU A Money Machine, Q.C. TIMES (July 1, 2013), 
https://qctimes.com/sports/high-school/basketball/boys/bottom-line-aau-a-money-
machine/article_b12456f6-607d-5fd1-9b8d-7d01d00aedb5.html. 
32.  Id. 
33.  See Nike EYBL the Inside Scoop, supra note 30. 
34.  Ricky O’Donnell, Everything to Know About Peach Jam 2018, Basketball’s Biggest Recruiting 
Showcase, S.B. NATION (July 11, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/college-basketball/2018/7/11/17552838/ 
peach-jam-2018-recruiting-college-basketball-cole-anthony-james-wiseman-duke-kentucky.  
35. Peach Jam 2018: July 11–15, 2018, NIKE EYBL, https://web.archive.org/web/20190110193314/ 
http://www.nikeeyb.com/games/.  
36.  Donna Ditota, How Does AAU Basketball Work? Inside the City Rocks, Upstate NY’s Premier Team, 
SYRACUSE (June 20, 2018), https://www.syracuse.com/sports/index.ssf/2018/06/albany_city_rocks 
_grassroots_basketball.html (explaining what a Nike EYBL team goes through and providing some truth to 
rumors about how EYBL teams operate. Ditota describes how City Rock’s EYBL team sponsorship with Nike 
narrowly covers costs to “four required tournaments on the EYBL circuit (Dallas, Indianapolis, Atlanta, [and] 
Hampton” and that teams must do well at these required tournaments to qualify for the Nike Peach Jam.). 
37.  Zach Schlemmer, Nike Readies a Limited Edition of Kevin Durant’s New Shoe for Annual ‘Peach 
Jam’ Tournament, FOOTWEAR NEWS (July 9, 2018), https://footwearnews.com/2018/focus/athletic-
outdoor/nike-kd-11-peach-jam-release-info-kevin-durant-1202585553/.  
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Numerous high-profile individuals, including Nike-affiliated 
representatives (coaches, scouts, managers and executives) will attend EYBL 
tournament games featuring middle school and high school athletes. Their 
strategy is to identify potential NBA talent early on, then monitor the prospects’ 
development as they mature.38  The main purpose of this identification is to 
develop a rapport with those high school athletes identified as potential NBA 
stars, and eventually sign the prospects to shoe deals when they turn 
professional.39  The earlier these representatives locate talent, the more time they 
have to evaluate a prospect’s worth, the potential for marketing their brand, and 
to develop interpersonal relationships.40 The most successful scouts, brand 
managers and executives will prioritize these players based on their talent, and 
will try keep their prospects in their respective circuit throughout their amateur 
basketball careers.41 Inserting themselves into the lives of these prospective 
NBA stars is key to the shoe companies’ main goal: to gain an advantage in 
endorsing the prospective stars when they are drafted into the NBA.42 
These young men and their families are also exposed to corrupt business 
managers, financial advisors, and coaches who are sometimes affiliated with a 
shoe brand and work in concert to use their influence over high school athletes 
to attend specific universities.43    According to one complaint challenging this 
model, the “principal purpose” of the scheme “is to help Adidas artificially grow 
and preserve market share in the ultracompetitive sneaker industry . . . [t]hrough 
this exploitation of the young players’ images and likenesses to consumers . . .  
Adidas profited.”44  Under-the-table payments, free merchandise, and exploiting 
young men for the shoe brand’s profit is a part of the larger scheme to keep these 
young men within the brand so the brand can profit from them when they are 
professionals.  
 
38.  Schmidt & Manning, supra note 22. 
39.  Hobson, supra note 13. 
40.  See, e.g.,Oliver Maroney, The Life of an NBA Player Manager, BASKETBALL INSIDERS (Nov. 4, 2016), 
http://www.basketballinsiders.com/the-life-of-an-nba-player-manager-randy-osei-thon-maker-anthony-
bennett-andrew-wiggins/ (explaining how Randy Osei met former number one draft pick Anthony Bennett 
through playing AAU basketball, and how Tyler Ennis knew him since high school. He explains how his 
extended relationship with the two gave him an advantage in becoming these players’ manager because he 
has known them for long enough to gain their trust.). 
41.  Estes, supra note 3.  
42.  Marsha Durr, The Tipping Point: Mayhem in College Sports Requires Congress to Finally Intervene 
in NCAA Governance, 8 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 26, 32 (2018) (explaining that the bribery scheme’s 
main focus originated from a mutual agreement, which coaches to use influence over star athletes to steer 
them toward certain athletic shoe companies, agents, and advisors). 
43.  Bowen Complaint, supra note 6, at 89–90. 
44.  Id. at 104.  
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The major shoe companies compete aggressively to get elite players to join 
their circuits.  This competition includes extensive funding for a network of 
AAU clubs.  For example, the Oakland Soldiers (EYBL team), for whom 
LeBron James and other NBA stars played as high school stars, will likely use 
their NBA heritage as leverage to attract other high school phenoms across the 
country to want to play for that team.45  These top high school players in turn 
obtain greater exposure to college, NBA scouts, and get to compete against the 
best players their age in the United States. Moreover, the teams from their 
respective circuits will compete against each other and the top teams will then 
compete in culminating national tournaments: Nike Peach Jam, Adidas Nations 
and the Under Armour Association.  
During these national tournaments each of the three major shoe companies 
work in concert with college coaches and others with whom they have 
relationships to persuade top talent to switch over to their circuit; alternatively, 
they use the conference to obtain parents’ contact information in order to 
influence their child to attend a certain college bearing their brand.46  Rick 
Pitino, former head coach at the University of Louisville said, "[I]t’s a very 
competitive thing by these shoe companies to get players. They’re going out and 
recruiting like us, in the summertime. ‘Let’s get this kid to the (Nike) EYBL. 
Let’s get this kid in the Adidas Nations.’”47  
B. Cost to shoe companies, including how much spent on young players who 
do not become stars. 
The significant sums spent on AAU basketball became highly publicized as 
a result of recent criminal convictions for bribing star recruits and their families.  
This section suggests that much of the money shoe companies spend on youth 
athletics is wasted, because the vast majority of teens do not become NBA stars 
whose endorsements are valuable.   
The case of Marvin Bagley, Jr., whose high school career was transformed 
by money poured into his AAU team for which his father was the coach, is 
illustrative.48  Bagley’s saga came to light when his parents filed for bankruptcy 
 
45.  Marc J. Spears, The Weekend Bay Area Trip that Helped Make LeBron James a Star, YAHOO (June 
1, 2015), https://sports.yahoo.com/news/the-weekend-bay-area-trip-that-helped-make-lebron-james-a-star-
061242534.html.  
46.  Estes, supra note 3. 
47.  Id. (discussing Rick Pitino’s notion that shoe brand officials pursue young athletes from other circuits 
and try to influence them to switch another brand’s circuit). 
48.  See Manning & Schmidt, Marvin Bagley III and the Loyalty Game: How Sneaker Dollars 
Transformed Youth Basketball, OREGONIAN, Mar. 17, 2018, https://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/ 
page/the_loyalty_game.html. 
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in 2008, with a combined family income of $44,000.49 Four years later, tax 
forms in 2012 confirmed that the family listed a home in Southern California 
valued in a range between $750,000 to $1.5 million.50  Marvin Jr. had attended 
Sierra Canyon High School, a Nike-sponsored private institution, whose tuition 
costs are $36,250 per year.51  Sierra Canyon refused to reveal details of its Nike 
deal, but there was evidence that Nike merchandise-only sponsorships can 
quickly exceed $10,000 a year for high school teams.52  In addition to cash 
payments for sponsorship, Nike also pays money to the coaching staff and those 
involved with the program.53 
Although reporters have been unable to uncover the precise amount of 
money Nike spent on the Bagley family, under the cloak of payments from Nike 
to Bagley’s Nike-sponsored AAU team, his family was able to afford a better 
life including affording an expensive private school.54  Unfortunately for Nike, 
their investment went awry when Bagley signed a highly publicized five-year 
deal worth $2 to $3 million a year with competitor Puma.55 
The size of shoe company investments in payments to sponsored AAU 
teams is significant.  The Kentucky Travelers (EYBL team) “receive $35,000 
per year from Nike, paid in two installments. The first $25,000 comes in March, 
and the final $10,000 in June.”56  Further the team representative explained, 
“[p]ayments from Nike cover the Travelers’ league entry, flights to 
tournaments, van rentals, hotel stays and meals.”57  In addition to investing in 
AAU teams and private high schools, Nike also sponsors numerous high-profile 
high schools around the country, as well as hundreds of AAU teams.58    
Major shoe companies also pay these prospects’ parents thousands of 
dollars in an attempt to influence their son to attend a college program they 
 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Manning & Schmidt, supra note 48. 
55.  Nick DePaula, Marvin Bagley III Inks 5-year Shoe Deal with Puma, Sources Say, ESPN (June 14, 
2018), http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/23795930/marvin-bagley-iii-signs-endorsement-deal-footwear-
apparel-endorsement-deal-puma.  
56.  Adam Himmelsbach, Club Team, Nike Reap Benefits of Sponsorship, COURIER J., Oct. 17, 2014, 
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/basketball/2014/10/17/club-team-nike-reap-benefits-
sponsorship/17458415/Rines. 
57.  Id. 
58. Darren Rovell, Shoe Company Wants Deal Maker’s Influence, ESPN (Sep. 23, 2016), 
http://www.espn.com/sportsbusiness/news/2003/0922/1621525.html. 
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sponsor.59  Recent criminal convictions revealed Adidas payments of $40,000 
to the father of a star player being recruited by North Carolina State, and $90,000 
payments to the mother of a Kansas recruit.60  
Public information regarding funds spent on Nike AAU teams permits an 
estimate of Nike’s expenditures.  In the EYBL there are four divisions, with ten 
teams in each division for three age ranges (15U, 16U and 17U).61  Four teams 
multiplied by three age range groups equals 120 teams.  Considering the annual 
payment Nike pays the Kentucky travelers of $35,000 a year multiplied by 120 
teams, this suggests that Nike spends around $4.2 million dollars on funding 
EYBL teams alone (estimate not including women’s EYBL teams).62  This 
calculation does not include Nike’s sponsorship of elite high school teams or 
bribe money.  In sum, Nike will spend well more than $4 million annually on 
teenage boys, in an effort to steer them to Nike-colleges, in hopes this will 
facilitate Nike’s ability to sign these young men to endorsement contracts should 
they become NBA stars.  Others tell of NBA players who have clauses in their 
contracts requiring shoe companies to spend $150,000 to $165,000 on AAU 
teams of their choice,63 suggesting this estimate may be low. 
Because less than two percent of college players will get drafted into the 
NBA,64  and less than one percent of high school players receive scholarship to 
a Division I college program,65 Nike spends a significant amount on AAU teams 
and potential prospects who do not earn a scholarship at a major college 
program, much less play in the NBA at a level where their endorsement would 
lead to profitable sales of Nike products.66 Although there are some benefits of 
the current system to youth basketball and to the shoe brands, there is wasted 
investment in those who participate within the circuits and in high school and 
 
59.  Will Hobson, Before this Hoops Recruit Chose Indiana, Adidas Made Sure He Stayed Under its Tent, 
WASH. POST, May 16, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/before-romeo-langford-chose-
indiana-adidas-made-sure-he-stayed-under-its-tent/2018/05/16/2c77d384-539e-11e8-a551-
5b648abe29ef_story.html?utm_term=.794dc6012758.  
60.   Id.  
61.  For a list of the U17 Teams see 2019 Nike EYBL Divisions Announced, D1 CIRCUIT (Mar. 31, 2019), 
https://www.d1circuit.com/news_article/show/1008627. 
62.  Himmelsbach, supra note 56. 
63.  Estes, supra note 3 (“NBA player Derrick Rose’s incentive-laden Adidas endorsement deal, for 
example, requires the company to pay an AAU team or teams of his choice a total of $150,000 to $165,000 
per year, plus as much as $85,000 in Adidas products — as long as the team is an Adidas affiliate.”). 
64.  Brice Fleckenstein, What Percentage of College Basketball Players Go to the NBA?, QUORA (Jan. 
27, 2018), https://www.quora.com/What-percentage-of-college-basketball-players-go-to-the-NBA. 
65. Patrick O’Rourke, Odds of a High School Athlete Playing in College, SCHOLARSHIP STATS, 
http://www.scholarshipstats.com/varsityodds.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2019). 
66.  See, e.g., Himmelsbach, supra note 56 for an example of Nike spending $35k a year on one team 
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do not proceed further.  This wasted capital is an allocative inefficiency that 
could be reinvested in a more efficient way at the professional level.  
C. Distorting effect on selection of colleges 
If shoe companies were not intertwined within youth basketball, there 
would be a significant decrease of under-the-table payments.   This would lead 
to less corruption, reduced instances where an athlete forfeits collegiate 
eligibility, saved expenses for shoe companies, and increased dispersion of 
talent in collegiate basketball.  Elite players seeking to play college basketball 
would choose universities unbiased by under-the-table payments that come at 
the expense of their ability to make independent decisions about their rights as 
professional players.  Their decisions, uninfluenced, can be tailored to the 
quality of their education, their athletic development, loyalty to their home 
region, and social concerns, rather than being steered to the university where 
their matriculation is most valued by a shoe company with whom their AAU 
team had been affiliated. 
Shoe companies have taken advantage of the AAU process and made it their 
own corrupt bidding auction.  Adidas executive Jim Gatto’s recent conviction 
demonstrates how shoe company representatives distort and funnel top 
prospective athletes into top affiliate collegiate basketball programs.67  Once an 
athlete tries out for an AAU circuit, it opens the door for those around the 
prospect to influence him to stay locked into that circuit.  Not only are these 
prospects put on elite teams, they receive national recruitment, bragging rights, 
free shoes and apparel, and notoriety from their peers.68  Just as a parent nurtures 
their child with clothes, food, love and a roof to live under, shoe brands have 
used AAU circuits to provide the similar essential means to prospective talented 
basketball players.69  Absent the current competition to gain long-term 
advantages from future stars, shoe companies’ capital allocated to persuading 
prospective athletes — most of whom will not play professionally and will not 
compete at profitable collegiate universities — and their families to attend a 
 
67.  See Jack Newsham, Ex-University Of Arizona Coach Cops to $20K Hoops Bribery Scheme, LAW 360 
(Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.law360.com/sports/articles/1120767/ex-univ-of-ariz-coach-cops-to-20k-hoops-
bribery-scheme?nl_pk=b8322f18-889c-4abe-b5b2- 
6e47f2229d11&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=sports&read_more=1 
(“footwear company officials had paid athletes and their families to play ball for Adidas-sponsored schools in 
hopes that they would stick with Adidas when they went pro after graduating”). 
68. See David Cordova, Nike EYBL Starts Off In Hampton, DAVE’S JOINT (Apr. 24, 2017), 
https://davesjoint.net/2017/04/24/nike-eybl-starts-off-in-hampton/. See also Nike EYBL the Inside Scoop, 
supra note 30.  
69.  Spears, supra note 45 (illustrating a story of how AAU coaches provide hospitality for highly touted 
prospects. Spears explains how head coach of the Oakland Soldiers allowed LeBron James to sleep on his 
couch in order for him to compete for their team in the Elite 8tournament.). 
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university will be reallocated toward investments more likely to secure a 
return.70 
D. Distorting effect on selection of agent and managers 
When young elite athletes become professionals, they must make critical 
business decisions in selecting agents and managers to negotiate contracts with 
professional clubs, pursue endorsement opportunities, and manage their 
finances.71 The recent case of former University of Arizona assistant basketball 
coach Emmanuel Richardson illustrates how shoe company practices distort a 
prospective athlete’s selection of these critical advisors.  Richardson recently 
pled guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery as he received “$20,000 from 
undercover federal agents to refer college ballers their way for business.”72  
The former Wildcats coach was caught on tape agreeing to refer 
players to Munish Sood, a sports management exec turned 
state’s witness, and his business partner Christian Dawkins in 
exchange for envelopes of cash from two undercover agents 
who were supposedly providing financial support to Sood and 
Dawkins’s company. He choked up as he admitted as much to 
U.S. District Judge Edgardo Ramos.73 
As United States Attorney Geoffrey Berman explained, “Richardson, entrusted 
to help players develop as athletes and young men, instead helped himself to the 
cash offered by unscrupulous agents and financial advisers[.]”74  
Another example is when, 
[a] secretly recorded video played in New York federal court 
showed Christian Dawkins, who is accused of bribing assistant 
college basketball coaches in exchange for steering their 
players toward his business management venture, handing cash 
to former TCU assistant Corey Barker . . . Marty Blazer, a 
former financial adviser who aided the government’s 
investigation, testified that the cash was a $6,000 bribe, what 
was to be the first for Barker to establish a long-term 
‘relationship.’  
 
70.  Because the focus of this Article is how a new arrangement between the NBA and its players would 
also benefit shoe companies, a complete discussion of the distorting effects of youth basketball corruption on 
college basketball is beyond the scope of this Article.   
71.  See KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE & TIMOTHY DAVIS, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS AGENTS 20 (2003).  
72.  Newsham, supra note 67. 
73.  Id.  
74.  Id.  
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That meant funding illicit payments to players Barker recruited 
and monthly bribes, all in exchange for him using his influence 
to steer players to sign with them for management services 
when they go professional, Blazer said. 75 
Agents can be family members, AAU coaches, or individuals affiliated with 
shoe companies. Agents frequently have relationships with shoe companies and 
AAU teams; the purpose of the relationships is to gain an advantage in signing 
the best players contingent on them turning pro.76 
Last month, the NCAA banned four AAU teams from the July 
live period for having an association with an agent. New 
England Playaz, Florida Rams and Worldwide Renegades had 
to separate themselves from their program director, and the 
players had to find a different team. SEBL Elite All-Stars was 
allowed to stay intact, but needed to find a new coach. The 
NCAA investigation stemmed from an email sent by prominent 
sports agent Andy Miller to the program directors of the four 
aforementioned AAU programs. In the email, Miller scolds the 
four men – T.J. Gassnola, Matt Ramker, Desmond Eastman and 
Tony Edwards – for not sending him enough first-round picks 
in exchange for financial support.77 
Shoe companies alter this process because they have established connections 
with their own preferred agents.  Shoe companies indirectly employ agents 
because they pay the players the agents represent.  Top players are likely to sign 
with the top agents.  Therefore, the AAU coaches, college coaches and others 
affiliated with the shoe brand will steer a young prospect to sign with an agent 
they know will convince the athlete to sign with their brand.78 
It shouldn’t come as a surprise that many of the top AAU 
programs have some association with agents. After all, when 
these prominent programs are getting big money from Nike, 
Adidas and Under Armour to be successful and produce pro 
players, it’s hard to avoid sports agents. Agents funnel money 
to certain AAU teams in an attempt to get a leg up on the 
 
75.  Zachary Zagger, Feds’ Hoops Trial Witness Explains Bribes Caught on Tape (LAW 360), Apr. 25, 
2019, https://www.law360.com/articles/1153696/feds-hoops-trial-witness-explains-bribes-caught-on-tape.  
76.  Critical Coaches: How Deep is the Relationship Between Agents and AAU Programs?, CBS SPORTS 
(Aug. 15, 2012), https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/critical-coaches-how-deep-is-the-
relationship-between-agents-and-aau-programs/.   
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. 
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competition when it comes time for a prospect from that team 
to choose an agent. 
Coaching one of the major AAU teams isn’t necessarily a 
profitable exercise. It takes a financial commitment – or plenty 
of financial backing. If the shoe companies aren’t providing 
enough funding, a program director is more apt to listen to 
agents or runners. Some college coaches also pointed to runners 
and agents placing kids on shoe-sponsored teams – and then 
giving money to said teams in exchange. 
I spoke with several AAU coaches during the summer, and one 
of the subjects that came up was pipelines between AAU 
programs and sports agents. 
‘If multiple players from my program have had success with the 
same agent, it makes other players want to go to that agent too,’ 
one AAU coach said.79 
In addition to agents, star athletes often select managers that, supplementing the 
contract negotiation and endorsement-finding work of agents, assist the athlete 
in everyday tasks similar to a personal assistant.  “One night they could be 
negotiating an endorsement deal, the next they could be helping a player with a 
community event. [A manager’s] job is to help his players with whatever they 
need, which can vary greatly from client to client.”80 
Today’s professional athletes are similar to many small 
businesses. The demands of the profession, the high amount of 
income, and numerous ‘off the court’ factors have some 
professional athletes choosing to hire a personal Business 
Manager. Often this is a close personal friend, family member, 
or representative from the Agents office.81 
An example of how player managers spring into the lives of an NBA prospect 
can be illustrated by Randy Osei and his connection to former number one NBA 
draftee Anthony Bennet and current NBA player Tyler Ennis.  He explains, “I 
came into this business as Anthony Bennett’s manager. I am a few years older, 
but Anthony and I were pretty close after playing on the same AAU team.”82  
Tyler Ennis further describes that he has known Osei since middle school.83  A 
 
79.  Id. 
80.  Maroney, supra note 40. 
81.  Adonal Foyle, So What Does a NBA Business Manager Do?, ADONAL FOYLE (Jan. 8, 2016), 
https://www.adonalfoyle.com/so-what-does-a-nba-business-manager-do/. 
82.  Maroney, supra note 40. 
83.  Id. 
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manager can range from a close friend of the prospect to someone who is 
affiliated with a shoe brand, including an AAU coach.  The NBA journey and 
many of the connections that last throughout NBA player’s career often begins 
during the AAU circuits.   
Some agents and managers essentially vie for prospects by soliciting 
payments to the prospect or his family.  
It can take different forms. Often a player has no idea he is 
being played. Often his parents, coaches or friends — the 
people he most trusts most — are active participants. And once 
a prospect or his family takes the bait by accepting cash or plane 
tickets or hotel rooms or any other benefit, the trap door snaps 
shut.  
With his amateur eligibility damaged, his basketball career may 
no longer be his own.  
. . . 
‘Everybody is involved in this scandal. There’s nobody left 
out,’ Sonny Vaccaro, a retired shoe company executive, told 
Courier Journal on Saturday. ‘. . . The most important person in 
the transaction is that high school kid . . . and he’s the poorest 
of all of them. And they’re all bidding on his ability to play 
basketball — to win championships, go to the Final Four, to sell 
shoes, to sell suits, to put money in investments.’  
. . . 
‘If we take care of everybody and everything is done, we 
control everything. … You can make millions off of one kid,’ 
sports agent Christian Dawkins allegedly told an undercover 
FBI agent when asked how he could ‘guarantee’ a player would 
sign with a particular financial adviser.84 
The key distortion is that agents and managers are supposed to be zealously 
pursuing the interests of their client, the athlete, while these illustrations 
illustrate how instead agents and managers are steering their client to a shoe 
company.  When corrupt agents and managers develop relationships that 
provide money to athletes in their families in the recruitment process, they can 
then hold the prospect’s future hostage.  This coercion is a subsidiary effect of 
the current shoe company scheme that could be avoided if a new plan was 
implemented.  
 
 
84.  Estes, supra note 3. 
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E. Benefits to youth basketball 
Counterbalanced against these distortions is one way in which shoe 
company subsidies to AAU basketball meet an important social need.  Unlike 
baseball and ice hockey, where elite athletes ‘pay to play’ and youth sports often 
exclude those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds,85 AAU basketball 
provides the kind of competition that would be unavailable to some 
socioeconomically disadvantaged athletes who only play high school 
basketball.   
That said, in the current age of social media, it would be unlikely for 
professional scouts and college coaches not to notice a superior high school 
talent playing solely for his high school team. As the NCSA observes, “recruits 
can use the power of social media to contact coaches, show coaches what kind 
of recruit they are and even gain the attention of college coaches who weren’t 
previously recruiting them.”86  A recruiting advisor suggests that “[s]ocial media 
can have a significant impact on your college recruiting journey. Since anyone 
can take a screen-shot and share it, nothing you post is ever really private 
anymore.”87   
For example, current NBA forward Otto Porter, Jr., did not participate in 
AAU and only competed with his high school team. 
. . . the 24-year-old Washington Wizards forward [is] an 
anomaly in today’s NBA. Almost all of the sport’s young stars 
played AAU (Amateur American Union) ball during their 
teenage years, as the league’s long been known as a place for 
players to face elite competition while gaining exposure to 
college and pro scouts. It’s not that Porter wasn’t good enough 
to play AAU—plenty of teams would’ve loved to have him. 
But his father, Otto Porter Sr., believed it would be better for 
his son’s development to train and play in their hometown. That 
may sound crazy when you consider that Porter grew up in 
Sikeston, a rural town in southeast Missouri . . . Yet here’s 
 
85.  Stephen F. Ross & Michael James, Jr., A Strategic Legal Challenge to the Unforeseen Anticompetitive 
and Racially Discriminatory Effects of Baseball’s North American Draft, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 127, 
130 (2015) (explaining that the essay “articulates the arguments that can be marshaled to potentially persuade 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the FTC, or the courts to find the Rule 4 draft illegal, or at 
least to raise sufficient doubts to motivate MLB clubs to alter their anticompetitive and antisocial rules”). 
86.  How to Use Social Media for Recruiting, NCSA, https://www.ncsasports.org/recruiting/contacting-
college-coaches/social-media (last visted Dec. 6, 2019). 
87.  Fred Bastie, Recruiting Column: The Effects of Social Media on College Recruiting, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 13, 2017, https://usatodayhss.com/2017/recruiting-column-the-effects-of-social-media-on-college-
recruiting.  
ROSS – ARTICLE 30.1 1/10/2020  12:07 PM 
2019]    BASKETBALL SHOE SCANDAL  29 
  
Porter today, a max-contract player with one of the most well-
rounded skill sets in the NBA. 88  
Young athletes and their parents prioritize participation in AAU over high 
school basketball for several reasons. First, AAU competitions provide greater 
exposure.  Second, college coaches and NBA scouts want to see the best players 
compete against each other.  Third, AAU not only helps the top players in the 
country improve their individual skills, but also aids NBA scouts in evaluating 
potential draftees and shoe company representatives evaluate who they want to 
endorse in the future.  Further, young athletes get the immediate satisfaction of 
playing for teams backed by their childhood NBA heroes such as Russell 
Westbrook, Chris Paul, Carmelo Anthony and many more.   
Nike’s Elite Youth Basketball League, which concluded earlier 
this month in Augusta, Georgia, with its annual Peach Jam 
Tournament, is a prime example of this business model. The 
tournament includes signature PEs and this year’s pool has 
teams backed by NBA players Chris Paul, Carmelo Anthony, 
and Bradley Beal, all of whom have endorsement deals with 
Nike or Jordan Brand. Moreover, Harry Giles, De’Aaron Fox, 
and Jayson Tatum—the third, fifth, and 20th selections in this 
year’s NBA Draft, respectively—were all standout performers 
in the 2015 Peach Jam.  
All three players played college ball at Nike-sponsored 
schools—Tatum and Giles at Duke, Fox at Kentucky—and 
have inked endorsement deals with the Swoosh since turning 
pro. If you’re a teenager who’s got skills and an obsession with 
basketball, why would you NOT want to be a part of that?89 
In addition, if the parents are a coach or team manager, they can receive funded 
trips around the country on the shoe company’s dollar.  
Further, although qualifying for a state championship or state tournament 
can improve a young athlete’s skills, it remains less effective than participating 
in an AAU tournament like the Nike Peach Jam, where they compete against 
the best in their age in the country.  
When talking to a college coach, he mentioned that it matters 
little to him how the player does during the season. Athletes 
could put up huge numbers but those don’t matter a ton because 
 
88.  Brandon Hall, Why Otto Porter Jr. Didn’t Play AAU Basketball (And Believes He’s Better Because 
of It), STACK (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.stack.com/a/why-otto-porter-jr-didnt-play-aau-basketball-and-
believes-hes-better-because-of-it.  
89.  Morgan McDaniel, How AAU Is Dominating High School Basketball, COMPLEX (Aug. 7, 2017), 
https://www.complex.com/sports/2017/08/aau-is-dominating-high-school-basketball. 
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it could be against bad competition. These coaches want to see 
them on the AAU circuit or at their camp during the summer. It 
allows the college coaches to work with them and see them 
against better competition.90  
To circumvent AAU, some top players would transfer to basketball prep 
schools.91  However, with states enforcing more rules limiting student transfers 
and discouraging recruiting, some players have deserted their high schools to 
put more emphasis on the AAU process.92 
Although AAU basketball benefits an elite teen player’s chances of 
recruitment and success, fundamental aspects of basketball that are lost.  College 
coaches, NBA coaches and prominent stars criticize AAU basketball. Steve 
Kerr, current head coach of the NBA’s Golden State Warriors complains, 
“[w]hat trouble[s] me [is] how much winning is devalued in the AAU structure, 
. . . The process of growing as a team basketball player — learning how to 
become part of a whole, how to fit into something bigger than oneself — 
becomes completely lost within the AAU fabric.”93  NBA great Kobe Bryant 
expressed his dissatisfaction with AAU basketball:  
I hate it because it doesn’t teach our players how to play the 
right way, how to think the game, how to play in combinations 
of threes. . .  I got lucky because I grew up in Europe and 
everything there was still fundamental, so I learned all the 
basics.94 
 
90.  Is AAU or High School Basketball More Important in the Recruiting Process?, RECRUITING 101 (Mar. 
19, 2018), http://www.recruiting-101.com/2018/03/19/aau-high-school-basketball-important-overall-
recruiting-process-2/. 
91.  Scott Rieger, The Tale of Brandon Jennings: Cautionary or Revolutionary?, BLEACHER REPORT (Dec. 
5, 2008) https://bleacherreport.com/articles/89514-the-tale-of-brandon-jennings-cautionary-or-revolutionary 
(explaining how Brandon Jennings transferred from his local high school in Compon, CA Dominguez Hills 
High School to Oak Hill Academy in Mouth of Wilson, VA); Sam Gordon, Findlay Prep Honors Alum Avery 
Bradley During Blowout Victory, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Nov. 6, 2018) https://www.reviewjournal.com/nevada-
preps/np-basketball/boys-basketball/findlay-prep-honors-alum-avery-bradley-during-blowout-victory-
1713419/ (explaining how Avery Bradley transferred from Bellarmine Prep in the Tacoma, WA area to 
Findlay Prep in Las Vegas, NV); Michael Scotto, Ben Simmons and D’Angelo Russell: From High School 
Teammates to ‘Blood for Blood’ NBA Playoff Opponents, ATHLETIC (Apr. 23, 2019) 
https://theathletic.com/939960/2019/04/23/ben-simmons-and-dangelo-russell-from-high-school-teammates-
to-blood-for-blood-nba-playoff-opponents/ (explaining how D’Angelo Russell transferred to Montverde 
Academy, FL from high school in Louisville, KY.). 
92.  Bob Cook, In High School Sports, Transfers are Creating Just Two Classes of Teams, FORBES, Feb. 
26, 2014, https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2014/02/26/in-high-school-sports-transfers-are-creating-
just-two-classes-of-teams/#1a50e6b2481b.  
93. Joshua Eferighe, Is AAU Ruining Basketball? How This Generation of NBA Stars is Different, 
KULTURE HUB (June 7, 2017), https://kulturehub.com/aau-basketball-nba-stars/.  
94.  Id. 
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Duke Coach Mike Krzyzewski observed that “the influence of the AAU 
programs on young players is that there is no structure to guide the coaches in 
developing leadership skills.”95  This is unsurprising: shoe company-sponsored 
AAU competitions are designed by the shoe companies to promote their 
individual players’ talent for the benefit of NBA scouts and big-time college 
coaches, not to display fundamentals or even win games.  Consequently, AAU 
critics note, in despair, that young players devalue winning, lack leadership 
qualities, and lack fundamentals. In high school, a coach’s incentive is to 
develop talent and win games, while the AAU coach’s incentive is to place the 
most players in college and hopefully to the NBA. 
To be sure, some elite players who do not become NBA stars are better off 
under the current scheme.  These include those who thoughtfully and willingly 
receive under-the-table benefits understanding that if successful they will be 
subject to relentless pressure to sign with agents and shoe companies that may 
not serve their future interests.  Others may need less training in fundamentals 
and experience playing for winning teams, and so benefit from free travel and 
merchandise afforded by the shoe company scheme.  Many others, however, 
particularly those from underprivileged areas where their parents cannot afford 
private coaching, would have greater opportunities for success if youth 
basketball focused on high schools and properly-supervised USA basketball 
teams whose goals were winning and fundamentals and not brand promotion. 
In sum, shoe companies make huge investments in youth basketball, which 
appear to be inefficient, as well as leading to corruption and criminal behavior.  
Although youth basketball yields benefit to promising young talent, these 
benefits can be gained through other, less corrupt, organizations such as USA 
basketball. Part III will discuss how money will be saved by shoe companies, 
and how our proposal would be more profitable for shoe companies, NBA 
players, and the league, as well as setting the stage for athletes to receive better 
training and have access to better coaching and competition under the aegis of 
USA basketball. 
III. A MORE EFFICIENT SOLUTION: EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS WITH NBA CLUBS 
There is a more efficient and socially-desirable approach than the current 
business model that major shoe companies use to attract athletes’ product 
endorsements.  In this Part, we describe our proposal to shift shoe company 
endorsement money to those NBA stars whose endorsements will create sales, 
through a new provision in the NBA collective bargaining agreement giving a 
 
95. Coach K Shares His Thoughts on AAU, WINNING HOOPS (Sep. 30, 2011), 
https://winninghoops.com/news/coach-k-shares-his-thoughts-on-aau/. 
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team’s official shoe sponsor exclusive negotiating rights to obtain shoe and 
apparel endorsements from the club’s players.  We analyze how this scheme 
will result in significantly more shoe company funds invested in NBA team 
sponsorships, and how redistribution of most of this money back to the players 
followed by a further redistribution by the NBPA to its players will leave the 
players in as good of a financial position, if not better, than they would be in 
without our scheme. Finally, we suggest that there will be enough money after 
the redistribution of funds to NBA players to support and fund youth basketball 
under the auspices of USA basketball.   
A. The proposal 
The market distortions and inefficiencies from competition among shoe 
companies to spend millions to recruit young prospects could be avoided if 
compensation were focused entirely on NBA stars.  We therefore propose an 
agreement between the NBA and the NBPA granting an NBA team’s official 
shoe and apparel sponsor with exclusive rights to negotiate the endorsements of 
players contracted to that club for covered products.  The agreement would still 
require a separate agreement between players and shoe companies for 
endorsement and transfer of name, image and likeness (NIL) rights, but would 
preclude players from endorsing or using their NIL rights to aid rival 
companies.96  To illustrate, if our proposal had been in effect this year, we 
suspect Nike would win the bidding to sponsor the New Orleans Pelicans; Nike 
would then separately negotiate an NIL agreement with Zion Williamson, who 
would also receive a huge sum as part of the redistribution of funds from Nike 
to the Pelicans to the NBPA.  Although Williamson’s deal with Nike would 
reflect his inability to negotiate with Under Armour, he would be free to do 
nothing, or to devote all endorsement efforts toward other products. 
A provision of the collective bargaining agreement limiting the ability of 
players to obtain competing bids from shoe companies for their services would 
 
96.  Although precise details would be negotiated by skilled attorneys for the NBA and the NBPA, we 
imagine that the official shoe company would have limited rights to all players’ likenesses in team photos, but 
any other use of player NIL rights would require a separate endorsement deal. Some athletes claim that they 
have safety or competitive reasons for preferring a particular shoe. To separate these legitimate concerns from 
commercial considerations, under our proposal athletes would be permitted to wear shoes from a non-club 
sponsor, but would be required to cover up trademarks or other design traits that would identify the brand of 
shoe worn. See, e.g., Adam Himmelsbach, Shoe Companies Pay Millions for Walking Ads, COURIER J. (Oct. 
20, 2014), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/basketball/2014/10/17/schools-shoe-deals-
make-long-lasting-ads/17458387/. (“At Kentucky, if an athlete has to wear a non-Nike shoe for medical 
reasons, the brand must be taped over and it cannot be promoted by the university.”). It is noteworthy that, 
when this paper was presented at a Penn State faculty seminar, legendary women’s volleyball coach Russ 
Rose claimed that over his long career at a Nike-sponsored school, none of his players had been unable to find 
a Nike shoe that was appropriate for athletic competition.   
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significantly increase the value of official sponsorship rights with each NBA 
club.97  The public recognizes NBA players as celebrities, “whose name[s] 
[have] attention-getting, interest-riveting and profit generating value . . . .”98  
Because NBA players have celebrity “attributes such as reputation, likeability, 
believability and attractiveness, several businesses invest in celebrity athletes to 
establish connections between their brand and high-profile athletes.”99  As with 
other businesses, NBA teams invest in players by offering them contracts in 
exchange for their services. Given NBA teams are their own brands and 
businesses, their acquisition of a top tier NBA star is of utmost value for their 
team brand.  
Celebrity endorsement is valuable to an NBA team because NBA stars 
essentially “lend their image”, and relatable characteristics to the team allowing 
the team to connect with fans to boost sales and increase profits.100 Essentially, 
NBA players favorable characteristics positively drive purchasing behavior of 
consumers.101  In turn, consumers driven by the characteristics of an NBA player 
will have a positive subsidiary increase on profits for NBA teams.  For 
illustration, LeBron James’ move to the Los Angeles Lakers raised ticket prices 
by over 400%.102 Further, his Los Angeles Lakers number twenty-three (23) 
jersey was the best-selling jersey in the NBA, further boosting overall profit for 
 
97.  Peter Verry, How to Get Kawhi Leonard’s Sold Out New Balance Shoes, FOOTWEAR NEWS, May 8, 
2019, https://footwearnews.com/2019/focus/athletic-outdoor/how-to-get-kawhi-leonard-new-balance-
sneakers-1202780552/ (Consider the decision of NBA star Kawhi Leonard to shift his endorsement deal from 
Nike to New Balance.  His branded shoe sold out within minutes of the shoes being up for sale to the public.). 
See also, Matt Welty, New Balance Bet on Kawhi Leonard and Won, COMPLEX, (June 14, 2019), 
https://www.complex.com/sneakers/2019/06/new-balance-bet-on-kawhi-leonard-and-won (stating that the 
“true value of Leonard and New Balance lies in him wearing New Balance before games. We’ve come to a 
point where people care more about what NBA players wear before the game than what they during it.”). 
98.  Abeza, et al., The World’s Highest-Paid Athletes, Product Endorsement, and Twitter, 7 SPORT, BUS. 
& MGMT. J. 332, 334 (2017).  
99.  Id. 
100.  Id. (explaining that “[M]arketers use star players’ appeal to endorse sport and non-sport products, 
and their likeable and trustworthy persona to positively influence consumers’ purchase decisions.”). Id. At 
332.  At the same time, we are skeptical that customers purchasing Kawhi Leonard’s new New Balance shoes, 
did so based on a perception of quality endorsement by an expert.  See generally Verry, supra note 97. As 
several observers have noted, affinity with celebrities, rather than the sincerity or motivation underlying the 
celebrity’s endorsement, seems to be driving sales.  Concerns about ‘sincerity’ have dissipated. See, e.g., 
Lauren Myers, A Picture Is Worth A Thousand Material-Connection Disclosures: Endorsers, Instagram, and 
the Federal Trade Commission's Endorsement Guides, 66 DUKE L. J.  1371, 1375 (2017) (citing Kevin YC 
Chung, Timothy P. Derdenger & Kannan Srinivasan, Economic Value of Celebrity Endorsements: Tiger 
Woods' Impact on Sales of Nike Golf Balls, 32 MARKETING SCI. 271, 271 (2013)). 
101.  Abeza et al., supra note 98, at 334. 
102.  Jessica Golden & Eric Chemi, LeBron James Effect Boosts Lakers Ticket and Merchandise Sales, 
CNBC (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/05/lebron-james-effect-boosts-lakers-ticket-and-
merchandise-sales.html.  
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the Lakers.103  His presence alone has boosted the Lakers overall profitability, 
and ticket prices for away games as well.104 
Under our proposal, the increased shoe sponsorship income would be 
largely turned back to the NBPA for redistribution to players.  Clubs would be 
acting, in effect, as wholesalers of image rights.  Superficially, players would 
receive significantly less for their individual shoe endorsement deals.  Although 
the shoe company that is the official sponsor of each player’s club will continue 
to generously compensate a player for his endorsement and use his individual 
image rights, the exclusive right means the player’s leverage is reduced to 
opportunities for endorsements with products of a different category.  However, 
if properly structured, the total amount that major shoe companies will pay 
should increase, and the scheme will monetarily compensate these players 
through a redistribution from NBA franchises. An efficient agreement would 
allow NBA clubs to increase their current income, while returning the 
overwhelming percentage of the sponsorship money back to the NBPA for 
redistribution to players.  Such an agreement would likely ensure that the NBPA 
would have sufficient funds to ensure that star players who would have received 
lucrative shoe deals are as well off as if they had been able to secure such a deal 
under the current system. 
B. How the proposal will transfer money spent on AAU teams to the NBA 
The proposal will channel millions that shoe companies spend funding 
summer youth circuits for the purpose of developing potential endorsement 
contracts more efficiently toward those players whose endorsement will actually 
benefit shoe companies. Instead of funding AAU teams for the primary purpose 
of securing loyalty from players who may never achieve professional success 
and distorting decisions of those that do, shoe companies would re-allocate 
funds to secure exclusive negotiating rights through an NBA team sponsorship.   
Although shoe brands receive a significant amount of revenue and benefits 
from marketing universities and their fanbases, sponsoring an NBA team would 
be more valuable.  Currently shoe companies spend as much money on 
endorsements with a single NBA player than an affiliate university.  To 
illustrate, Adidas spent $200 million dollars securing James Harden’s 
endorsement,105  significantly exceeding Adidas’ $160 million endorsement 
 
103. LeBron, Lakers Top NBA’s Most Popular Merchandise Lists, NBA (Apr. 25, 2019), 
https://www.nba.com/article/2019/04/25/top-merchandise-jersey-sales-2018-19-season-official-release.  
104.  Golden & Chemi, supra note 102.  
105.  Sam Amick, James Harden Agrees to $200 Million Shoe Contract with Adidas, USA TODAY, Aug. 
13, 2015, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/rockets/2015/08/13/james-harden-adidas-shoe-contract 
/31634809/.  
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deal with the University of Louisville.106  This suggests that the value of a 
university sponsorship as a means to drive sales among avid fans of that 
university is far less, and implies that even contributions to major programs like 
Louisville are driven to a significant degree by the shoe company’s hopes of 
gaining a competitive advantage in signing former Cardinal hoop stars to 
professional endorsement contracts.107    
Likewise, LeBron James’ value to Nike is reflected in Nike’s sales of his 
signature shoe, which rose thirteen percent annually to $340 million in 2014 and 
topped $400 million in 2015.108  UCLA men’s basketball, while endorsed by 
Adidas, brought in $12.3 million a year in average revenue for the school.109  
Although shoe companies would continue to offer modest sponsorship deals to 
colleges, a shift of shoe company investment from grassroots basketball circuits 
and collegiate sports to the NBA would be more efficient.   
C. How the proposal significantly increases revenues to the NBPA 
The proposal uses the collective rights of the players to ensure that shoe 
company endorsements more efficiently target those players who actually drive 
consumer purchases, with the NBA clubs acting in part as wholesale agents 
collecting a sizable fee.110  For this proposal to succeed, when individual NBA 
teams contract with one of the major shoe companies, the vast majority of the 
incremental money that NBA clubs will receive under the new scheme will need 
to be redistributed to the NBPA, which will then transfer the funds back to the 
players.  To minimize harm to current expectations, all existing players would 
be excluded from the agreements, and going forward the NBPA would likely 
 
106.  Jeff Greer, University of Louisville Releases Details of $160 Million Adidas Contract, COURIER J., 
Aug. 25, 2017, https://www.courier-journal.com/story/sports/college/louisville/2017/08/25/university-
louisville-announces-adidas-apparel-contract-extension/600482001/.  
107.  David Southorn, Boise State Athletics to Extend Nike Deal Through 2025, I.D. STATESMAN, (June 
12, 2018), https://www.idahostatesman.com/sports/college/mountain-west/boise-state-university/boise-state-
football/article212983494.html (demonstrating Conferences less likely to attract NBA stars attract even 
smaller amounts in sponsorship dollars). For example, the Mountain West conference team Boise State 
University signed an extension with Nike for a total of $12.16 million through the 2025 season, and Colorado 
State University obtained an $11 million deal with Under Armour. Id.  It is difficult to explain this difference 
solely in terms of the relative number of fans of the Louisville Cardinals, Boise State Broncos, or Colorado 
State Rams. 
108.  Leo Sun, Why Nike Inc Signed a Lifetime Deal with LeBron James, MOTLEY FOOL (Dec. 19, 2015), 
https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/12/19/why-nike-inc-signed-a-lifetime-deal-with-lebron-
ja.aspx.  
109.  Cork Gaines, The 25 Schools That Make the Most Money in College Sports, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 13, 
2016), https://www.businessinsider.com/schools-most-revenue-college-sports-2016-10.  
110.  An NBA club sponsorship has independent value for sponsors beyond their ability to secure 
individual endorsement with players, and the opportunity to activate player/club endorsement has symbiotic 
effects.  
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adopt a formula that compensates top stars in a manner that permits them to 
receive, when combined with their substantial but reduced income from 
individual deals, an amount equivalent to that which they would receive under 
the current system.   
The proposal’s aim is to create a sufficient increase in payments likely to 
secure positive investment returns for shoe companies, and that the result is 
superior for the league and its players.  NBA teams will achieve a marginal 
increase in sponsorship revenue even if the bulk of increased funds go back to 
the players.  The lump-sum payment to the NBPA will allow star players to be 
compensated according to their worth, with additional funds available to support 
other players.  
D. Enough money left over to support youth basketball 
If crafted properly, the proposal will permit the shoe companies to reduce 
overall spending by substantially eliminating wasteful and often corrupt 
spending on teenagers, while providing more money to clubs and to players 
collectively.  In addition, it should create additional surplus funds that would be 
available, if the owners and players would agree, to fund youth basketball 
programs.  The legitimate purpose of allowing prospective collegiate athletes to 
obtain exposure for college scholarships can be done under the auspices of USA 
basketball, the official governing board for the sport and operator of youth 
representative teams in international competition.   
Currently, USA Basketball invites the best high school players in the 
country to represent the USA.111  The team is sponsored by Nike and they play 
other countries in an Olympic style format through FIBA (The International 
Basketball Federation).  The goal would be to operate youth USA basketball as 
European clubs do with their youth teams,112 and avoid criminal consequences 
from coaches and shoe company executives without stifling a high school 
athlete’s ability to participate collegiately. 
Shoe company subsidies for AAU basketball fill a strong need for 
development and exposure for elite players from poor, rural, or working-class 
families.113  Traditionally, development and exposure was filled by high school 
 
111.  See Eighteen Finalists Remain for 2018 USA Men’s U18 National Team, USA BASKETBALL (June 
3, 2018), https://www.usab.com/news-events/news/2018/06/mu18-finalists.aspx.  
112. See, e.g., Jack Holmes, Soccer’s 10 Best Youth Academies, PASTE  (Mar. 31, 2015), 
https://www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2015/03/soccers-10-best-youth-academies.html.  
113.  See McDaniel, supra note 89 (“It’s an enticing pitch; give exclusive gear and a chance to meet NBA 
stars to the kids, while guaranteeing little to no out-of-pocket cost to the parents—in the form of generous 
allowances for travel and lodging—and in exchange, the coaches influence players to sign with schools that 
have sponsorship deals with the companies that are bankrolling the entire operation.”). 
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basketball, which attracted major public attention and exposure.114 In some east 
coast cities like New York City, local parks put on summertime informal 
competitions on urban hardcourts that received the same attention as an AAU 
tournament would today.115 
As an illustration, a popular tournament was a summer pro-am league called 
the Entertainers Basketball Classic (EBC) hosted at Rucker Park in New York 
City.  These teams were owned and sometimes coached by popular hip-hop 
artists and urban celebrities such as Jay Z, Sean “Diddy” Combs, and Fat Joe.116  
The EBC at Rucker Park has hosted NBA stars ranging from Allen Iverson and 
Kobe Bryant to more recent LeBron James and Kevin Durant.117  Touted high 
school basketball players would be able to get a chance to compete against the 
NBA stars.  An example is current Los Angeles Laker Lance Stevenson. Then 
enrolled in Lincoln High School, Lance was able to show his talents at an EBC 
game where he scored twenty-seven points against two NBA guards: Nate 
Robinson and Jamal Crawford.118  The EBC allowed Lance to get exposure to 
celebrities and  college coaches and also gave him a chance to compete.119 
If the business model for shoe companies changed, where would poor kids 
get access to training, development, and exposure?  For many reasons, it is 
unclear if high school basketball will retain its former luster, as high school 
football still does.  Unlike Europe or Latin America, elite players will not be 
trained in academies run by professional clubs seeking to sign players at age 
sixteen.  In the United States this business model runs afoul of NCAA 
regulations, as high school kids are not permitted to receive payment from a 
professional club.120  Consider current NBA player Enes Kanter, he received 
more than “$33,000 in impermissible benefits” in exchange for his basketball 
 
114.  Id. (“AAU has long supplanted traditional high school hoops programs as the premiere destination 
for collegiate recruiting.”). 
115.  See, e.g., Cal Griffin, The Entertainers Basketball Classic, ALL THINGS HOOPS (Aug. 13, 2017), 
http://www.allthingshoops.com/the-entertainers-basketball-classic/. 
116.  Id. 
117.  Id. 
118.  David Astramskas, Top 10 Lance Stephenson Moments from GM4 Vs the Cavs, BALL IS LIFE (Apr. 
23, 2018), http://ballislife.com/top-10-lance-stephenson-moments-from-gm4-vs-the-cavs/.  
119. Lance Stephenson Is Born Ready, STARTING FIVE (Jan. 15, 2008) , https://thestartingfive. 
wordpress.com/2008/01/15/lance-stephenson-is-born-ready/ (explaining how Lance Stephenson “followed up 
his Sophomore City Championship with a New York State Championship and became the youngest player to 
play in the [Pro-Am] division at EBC (Rucker Park). Although the championship game featured five NBA 
players, Stephenson was named its MVP and since then has been actively recruited by every major college 
program in the country.”). 
120.  See NCAA Division I Manual, rule 12.1.2(d), page 64. 
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services from a Turkish club during his high school years, and the NCAA 
declared him ineligible to compete in NCAA games that season.121   
Further, there is no incentive for NBA clubs to create basketball academies 
to train elite players, because players cannot be signed by the sponsoring 
academy due to their young age and would be subject to the NBA draft.122  This 
point can be illustrated by the controversy of developing young talent in the 
MLB.  MLB teams can sign foreign players younger than American players, and 
the foreign players are usually retained by the team that develops them, 
warranting a return on their investment.123 In contrast, if MLB teams spent the 
money to make youth academies in America, they would not be able to sign 
American youth due to their age, and MLB teams funding these academies 
would risk a no return on their investment because the young prospects would 
be subject to the MLB draft and subsequently drafted by any team.124  Moreover, 
“the return on investment in scouting and developing foreign players is far 
greater than the return on investing similar effort in young American 
ballplayers.”125 However, NBA teams have no incentive to create basketball 
academies because it would be a wasted investment of funds. 
Although NBA club-run basketball academies are not viable options today, 
USA Basketball is an appropriate organization to oversee grassroots basketball, 
with the potential for young athletes to receive benefits of training and 
leadership not currently available in AAU competitions.126 USA basketball 
routinely attract the best coaches and training personnel that provides the 
athletes with a forum to leave egos aside, maximize their talent and compete 
with our country across their chests. USA basketball has been working in 
concert with the NBA to promote better youth basketball through a standard 
created by USA basketball and the NBA.127 Although, AAU provides a 
competitive environment with qualified coaches and premier training designed 
to highlight individual skills for college coaches and NBA scouts, USA 
basketball creates an opportunity for kids to be coached and trained by former 
 
121.  ASSOCIATED PRESS, NCAA Rules Kentucky’s Enes Kanter Permanently Ineligible, ESPN (Jan. 7, 
2011), http://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/news/story?id=6000134. 
122.  See Ross & James, supra note 85, at 133. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Id.at 131. 
126.  Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 784 (1990) 
(noting that AAU provides a competitive environment with qualified coaches and premier training designed 
to highlight individual skills for college coaches and NBA scouts, USA basketball creates an opportunity for 
kids to be coached and trained by former NBA players, NBA coaches, and the most well-respected collegiate 
coaches in the country). 
127.  Youth Basketball Guidelines, NBA https://youthguidelines.nba.com/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2019).  
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NBA players, NBA coaches and the most well-respected collegiate coaches in 
the country.128 If reaching the  NBA is that prospective athlete’s goal, then the 
benefits surrounding USA basketball would be an acceptable alternative route.   
For those primarily concerned about the welfare of elite underprivileged 
athletes, the optimal solution is, of course, a regulatory change permitting them 
to be compensated directly for endorsement deals.  This would require 
overhauling NCAA rules, a topic beyond the scope of this Article.  Under the 
current scheme, these athletes are rarely paid, and if they paid under-the-table, 
they risk serious consequences if discovered.  A large segment of elite teens 
would, we concede, lose the benefits of free apparel and perhaps some reduction 
in free trips to tournaments were elite amateur teams sponsored by USA 
basketball and designed to develop fundamental skills rather than promote an 
apparel brand.  We submit that this cost is outweighed by benefits to even these 
athletes of freedom from distorted decisions and the benefits to a greater number 
of young players from channeling youth sports through a non-profit governing 
entity. 
IV. WHY THIS IS UNLIKELY TO HAPPEN 
We acknowledge the informal reaction from almost any knowledgeable 
observer to our proposal: it is very unlikely to happen.  Although many accept 
our claim that the proposal is an efficient change in contract rights, for change 
to occur—specifically NBA players limiting their ability to exploit endorsement 
opportunities and image rights for shoe and sports apparel contracts—an 
enormous payment by the NBA to the union would be required and then an 
enormous redistribution back to the players.  What is theoretically possible is 
not always viable in reality. Our proposed scheme will not work unless parties 
are willing to overcome significant information asymmetries and bargaining 
costs.  
This part explores these information asymmetries and bargaining costs 
associated with obtaining NBA club and player approval to implement our 
proposed scheme.  First, we identify the uncertainty of information regarding 
the amount of money that will be redistributed and how redistribution will work.  
Second, we discuss the bargaining costs pertaining to reaching an agreement, 
and how the parties could be expected to overcome these bargaining problems 
because of the business acumen and intelligence of the parties to the deal.  
 
128. USA Basketball Men’s U18 National Team, USA BASKETBALL (2018), https://www.usab.com/mens/ 
u18/roster.aspx (showing the roster for the 2018 U18 Men’s Basketball team). The bottom of the page lists 
former NBA player, Danny Manning, and current University of Kansas coach, Bill Self, as well as Anthony 
Grant who is the current coach at the University of Dayton. See id. It is clear that these high school kids are 
getting premier basketball development from the best basketball minds in America. 
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A. Information problems 
Even if the parties were to seriously consider our proposal, they would be 
faced with the lack of accurate information about the sums involved, which 
makes it difficult for any stakeholder to conclude that they would be better off 
under our proposal than with the status quo.  The total sum that shoe companies 
are likely to spend securing sponsorships with NBA clubs, which would secure 
them exclusive rights to endorsements by each club’s players, is in part a 
function of the total costs that major shoe companies spend on AAU programs 
and under the table payments made to high school phenoms’ families.  These 
costs are plainly uncertain.  Major stars lack information as to whether the 
NBPA’s redistribution formula would fairly compensate them for their loss of 
leverage to obtain competitive bids from rival shoe companies.  Advocates of 
youth sports lack information as to how poor and working-class players will 
receive training, development, and exposure if shoe company subsidies are 
substantially reduced. 
B. Bargaining problems 
Bargaining costs are the costs required to come to an acceptable agreement 
with the other party to the transaction.  As Professor Hovenkamp explains: 
Social costs exceed private costs only when the costs of 
producing a bargain are so high that the market is unable to 
yield an efficient outcome. This might occur because there are 
too many bargainers, or the bargainers have imperfect 
information about relevant facts or the applicable law, or 
perhaps because they have opportunities to behave 
strategically. For example, if someone proposes to build a 
refining plant in a residential area, and the plant’s smoke will 
injure 10,000 home owners, but each rather slightly, the costs 
of bargaining might prevent the plant owner from 
compensating the 10,000 for their losses (assuming the plant 
owner is liable), even though the value of operating the plant is 
greater than the losses imposed on the 10,000 home owners.129 
If there are too many bargainers, there is a very high probability that every party 
will not receive adequate compensation or receive what they are owed.130  In the 
illustration above, is it impossible to compensate the surrounding 10,000 
affected citizens, if legal liability is presumed. This leads the parties to take the 
 
129.  Hovenkamp, supra note 126, at 784. 
130.  See id. 
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more expensive litigation route.131  A court would consider the circumstances 
and likely provide damages for a select few of the 10,000 citizens who are 
affected more than the others.132 The court’s decision is in conjunction with the 
hopes that this serves as an incentive for the plant to invest in better technology 
to fix their pollution problem harming the immediate citizens.133 
 Hovenkamp also analyzes why strategic behavior can cause problems:  
The strategist might always threaten to walk away unless he 
receives a larger share of the surplus, and he might occasionally 
walk away in order to make his threats credible. This multi-
bargain strategy might be profitable for him if the larger shares 
of the surplus he obtains from the sum of the successful trades 
outweigh his losses from the occasional trade where he carries 
out his threat. This creates a prisoners’ dilemma situation. If all 
the strategist’s opponents held firm in insisting on half of the 
surplus, the strategy would not work. But, acting individually, 
each opponent might find it individually maximizing to 
complete the bargain and take less than half of the surplus, 
rather than risk not completing the bargain at all and losing all 
the surplus. 134 
Hovenkamp concludes that the strategic bargainer will not be awarded the 
opportunity to be strategic where information is perfect.135  However, in real 
life, perfect information rarely exists.  Parties may not know if a bargainer is 
bluffing, or if information provided is misleading or inconsistent. 
The hopes for an efficient solution, however, are not as bleak as discussed 
in Coase’s train example and Hovenkamp’s air pollution case.  Unlike hundreds 
or thousands of unorganized and unsophisticated farmers or homeowners, NBA 
players are well organized and represented by sophisticated union leaders with 
expertise in law, business, and marketing that represent the player’s profit 
maximizing interests.  Further, the NBA owners, who would have to agree with 
the scheme, have selected an influential, innovative, and equally sophisticated 
commissioner in Adam Silver to represent them.  Only a few shoe companies 
(Nike, Adidas and Under Armour) are the most relevant bargainers along with 
the NBA and the NBPA.  Given the business acumen, expertise, and few 
numbers of parties to this transaction they are more than capable of overcoming 
significant bargaining and information costs that would exist.  
 
131.  Id. 
132.  See id. 
133.  See id. 
134.  Id. at 790-91. 
135.  Id. at 791. 
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Another difficulty is that, although the proposal is likely to enrich the NBA 
and its players and allow shoe companies to spend more efficiently, other 
influential stakeholders will be harmed and will use their influence to block the 
proposal.  Player agents, for example, are likely to be adversely affected because 
they will not receive a monetary percentage from the redistribution of licensing 
income from the NBA to the NBPA to their clients.  Corrupt and non-corrupt 
youth sport coaches paid handsomely by the shoe companies will also suffer. 
Formally, these parties have no say.  Collective bargaining agreements are 
solely between the NBA and the NBPA.136  Things that are discussed and 
negotiated are: “base salaries of players, the number of games they will play per 
season, whether their contracts are guaranteed by the league, player transfer 
procedures, their medical coverage, retirement plans, injury and non-injury 
grievances, club discipline procedures and access to the personal files/data of 
players.”137 Agents have a duty to their clients to educate themselves and their 
clients (NBA players) on the NBA bargaining agreement; however, they do not 
affect nor have their self-interests reflected in the actual negotiations.138 
V. ALTERNATIVE: LEGISLATIVE PRESSURE 
An alternative approach to overcoming significant bargaining and 
information costs is through legislative pressure.  The Coase theorem explains 
why the NBPA, NBA and the shoe companies will have issues reaching an 
agreement.  The lack of information and high bargaining costs are significant 
hurdles, but these are not insurmountable obstacles.  Because sports leagues 
typically do not face marketplace pressure to reach efficient agreements in the 
face of significant but not insuperable bargaining costs, another way to facilitate 
optimal results is the threat of legislative intervention.  Congress has done this 
before, when Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John McCain threatened 
MLB and the MLBPA with federal legislation regarding performance enhancing 
drug use, resulting in a mutual agreement.139 
 
 
 
136.  Collective Bargaining Agreements in Sports: How do They Work in the United States vs Europe, 
MONEY SMART ATHLETE BLOG (Aug. 29, 2018), http://moneysmartathlete.com/2018/08/29/collective-
bargaining-agreements-in-sports-how-do-they-work-in-the-united-states-vs-europe/. 
137.  Id.  
138.  Leigh Steinberg, How To Be A Great Sports Agent – Contract Negotiations, FORBES,July 11, 2016, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/leighsteinberg/2016/07/11/how-to-be-a-great-sports-agent-contract-
negotiations/amp/.  
139.  Brown, supra note 21. 
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A. Coase theorem applied: costs significant but not insuperable 
An efficient result is difficult to achieve in an environment that lacks the 
perfect information and costless bargaining posited by the Coase Theorem for a 
self-correcting market.  This is particularly true where risk aversion makes it 
unlikely the parties will act on their own.  In these cases, an external force may 
provide sufficiently more information and assist the parties in overcoming 
bargaining costs in order to achieve an efficient result. Though these bargaining 
costs are high, where the number of parties are limited, they should be able to 
negotiate with each other to reach an agreement.   
An excellent vehicle to accomplish these objectives are legislative hearings.  
Congress can justify hearings because it has plenary power to regulate interstate 
commerce.140  Legislative proposals could include regulation of youth sports, 
regulation of payments by shoe companies, hearings to determine why so many 
professional athletes sign endorsement contracts with the shoe company that 
sponsored their college team, and greater auditing of endorsement expenses.   
None of these proposals would be supported by the major stakeholders, just 
as no baseball stakeholder favored government intervention into player doping.  
However, through consideration of these proposals, Congress can gain 
information about shoe marketing and basketball, and its negative and positive 
effects on society.    
Legislative hearings can bring forward information the parties need to reach 
a bargain. Congressional investigators could unearth information on the total 
sums shoe companies spend on AAU basketball, including the amounts spent 
on AAU teams, reliable estimates of the amount of under-the-table payments, 
and professional player contracts.  This information would allow the NBA and 
NBPA to calculate how much money shoe companies would save and how their 
reinvestment at the NBA level will attain the same or even better success than 
the shoe company’s current scheme. 
Even with better information, bargaining costs may still preclude an 
efficient result. Suppose, for illustrative purposes, that the NBA clubs would be 
 
140.  Shoe marketing and basketball are undoubtedly interstate commerce under modern definitions.  
NCAA rules regulating matters such as shoe marketing in basketball “affect interstate commerce, because 
they regulate transactions between [persons] and their schools in multiple states nation-wide.”  In re Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 
2019) (holding that NCAA rules that capped the amount of compensation they are permitted to receive 
violated federal antitrust law and had severe anticompetitive effects).  A related case explained that “the 
modern legal understanding of ‘commerce’ is broad, ‘including almost every activity from which the actor 
anticipates economic gain.’”  O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1065 (9th Cir. 
2015) (holding that NCAA compensation rules could be subject to antitrust scrutiny).  Shoe marketing and 
basketball are both activities from which shoe companies, the NCAA, the NBA, and all ages of athletes 
involved seek to anticipate economic gain. 
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better off even if they shared all but 10% of the increased sponsorship income 
with players, while players would be better off even if the owners kept 30%.  
Under this scenario, the parties may be unable to reach an agreement on the 
appropriate sharing.  Furthermore, bargaining costs may preclude the efficient 
result, but this is highly unlikely when the NBA and NBPA observe the amount 
of funds the shoe companies will save and reinvest into their organization.   
The late Senator John McCain succeeded in this regard in similar 
circumstances.  During McCain’s career he had significant influence on the 
reformation of baseball and other sports.  He recognized the impact of 
professional athletics on the youth of the United States and saw this as justifying 
pressure on the MLB to enact better standards for performance enhancing drugs 
(PEDs).141  Legislative hearings demonstrated the prominence of performance 
enhancing drugs in baseball.142  The MLB’s standards regarding PED usage was 
initially very lenient; many players could use PEDs during the season by 
circumventing the testing process.143  Congress was concerned about the effects 
of PEDs on youth.144  As young athletes turned into promising baseball 
prospects, they would be susceptible to an introduction to PEDs through a 
professional trainer, who might explain how his childhood heroes use them.  The 
pressure to use PEDs to gain a competitive advantage led many to risk severe 
long-term consequences from injury or some of PED’s harsh side effects.145 
Initially, the MLB and the MLBPA could not reach an agreement because 
of the harshness of suspensions and randomness of testing.146  Owners sought 
harsher and longer penalties for testing positive for PEDs.147 Conversely, the 
MLBPA was heavily opposed to drug testing; this was “due to concerns about 
 
141.  Brown, supra note 21. 
142.  STAFF OF COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 109TH CONG., HEARING ON STEROID USE IN BASEBALL H.R 
DOC. NO. 20515-6143, at 7-10 (2005), available at https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats. 
oversight.house.gov/files/documents/20050317183306-12546%281%29.pdf).  
143.  Zachary D. Rymer, Full Timeline of MLB’s Failed Attempts to Rid the Game of PEDs, BLEACHER 
REPORT (June 10, 2013), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1667581-full-timeline-of-mlbs-failed-attempts-
to-rid-the-game-of-peds.  
144.  H.R Doc. No. 20515-6143, at 5-6. 
145. Associated Press, Parents Say ‘No Doubt’ Steroids Killed Son, ESPN, (Mar. 17, 
2005)http://www.espn.com/mlb/news/story?id=2015717 (“Rob Garibaldi shot himself in the head on Oct. 1, 
2002, at the age of 24. For years, he had been told that he had all the ingredients of a major league baseball 
player except size, so he started using steroids to gain the bulk he needed to make the bigtime. The price, in 
Raymond Garibaldi’s words, was ‘mania, depression, short-term memory loss, uncontrollable rage, delusional 
and suicidal thinking and paranoid psychosis.’”). 
146.  Rymer, supra note 143. 
147. MLBPA History: The 2000’s, MLB PLAYERS (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.nmnathletics.com/View 
Article.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=34000&ATCLID=211157644. 
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respecting players’ ‘legitimate privacy and due process rights.’”148 Both sides 
finally agreed to “more severe penalties for first and second-time drug 
offenders: first-time offenders would be suspended eighty games, and second-
time offenders would be suspended for an entire season of 162 games without 
pay.”149   
To facilitate agreement, Senator McCain, acting in his role as Commerce 
Committee Chairman, threatened federal legislation if MLB did not introduce a 
harsher drug policy:   
Major league baseball players and owners should meet 
immediately to enact the standards that apply to the minor 
leagues, and if they don’t, I will have to introduce legislation 
that says professional sports will have minimum standards for 
testing . . . I’ll give them until January, and then I’ll introduce 
legislation.150   
Soon thereafter, the MLB introduced its Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment 
Program.151  The program included more comprehensive testing as well as 
significantly harsher penalties to discourage cheating. “What I care about are 
high school athletes who are tempted to use steroids because they think that’s 
the only way they can make it in the major leagues,” McCain explained.152  
Just as Senator McCain worried about the effect on youth of PEDs, shoe 
company corruption also affects youth athletic opportunities.  The Senate 
Commerce Committee Chairman would be similarly justified in intervening to 
pressure the NBA, NBPA and shoe companies to create an alternate scheme that 
does not have a negative impact on our country’s youth. 
B. Applying these lessons to the shoe controversy 
Legislative pressure may be needed to facilitate an agreement between the 
NBA, NBPA, and shoe companies.  The MLB was under pressure from 
Congress because Congress made PEDs an illegal substance prohibited by the 
Federal Controlled Substances Act.153 The illegal acts of fraud and bribery that 
 
148.  Zackary Kessinger, “Strike Two, You’re Out!” the Need for A More Stringent Drug Policy in Major 
League Baseball, 10 WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REV. 257, 259 (2018). 
149.  Id. at 266–67. 
150.  Brown, supra note 21.  
151.  Id. 
152.  Id. 
153.  Edward Lazarus, Congress’ Decision to Subpoena Former Baseball Players to Testify, CNN.COM 
(Mar. 29, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/17/lazarus.steroids/.  
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surround the shoe scandal are all crimes punishable by months or years in 
prison.154   
The illegality of the criminal acts arising out of the scandal in youth sports 
gives Congress leverage to pressure major shoe companies as well.  Subpoena 
power with the resulting possibility of further criminal investigations, as well as 
public hearings, can force shoe companies to cooperate with the NBA and its 
players to reach a solution, negotiate a deal, and end the fraud, racketeering, and 
bribery that is ruining elite high school basketball players’ ability to participate 
in collegiate athletics and receive a college education.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Youth sports face recurring problems regarding access and development of 
elite players.  In basketball, shoe companies have created a system that is both 
monetarily inefficient and detrimental to youth basketball players and their 
families, shoe companies and universities.  Under-the-table payments by shoe 
companies have led to criminal indictments, compromised the careers of college 
coaches, and have hindered talented young basketball players from reaching the 
NBA and receiving a college education.  Yet the current scheme can be resolved 
with transparency and cooperation between the relevant parties: the major shoe 
companies, the NBA and the NBPA.  The business acumen, legal expertise and 
knowledge possessed by these parties leave no excuse to maintain the current 
scheme instead of reforms where most everyone involved will be better off.   
However, bargaining costs and information asymmetries sometimes get in 
the way of even the most capable parties to a deal to reach an agreement.  Unlike 
the bi-modal scenarios developed by Ronald Coase, these obstacles may be 
overcome with legislative pressure.  Where the marketplace will not drive actors 
to efficient solutions and government regulation is not preferred to private 
agreements, public policy justifies pressure on the parties to reach an agreement. 
However, given the few parties to this potential deal, legislative pressure in the 
form of the credible threat of government regulation combined with hearings 
and other techniques to gain additional information may be all that is required.   
 
 
154.  Schmidt & Manning, supra note 22. 
